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The Liability-Offset Theory of Peracchi
BRADLEY T BORDEN AND DOUGLAS L. LONGHOFEIC
I. Introduction
Transfers of property subject to liabilities are the focus of significant com-
mentary and multiple court decisions.' Such transactions conducted between
unrelated parties raise complicated issues and may trigger taxable gain or can-
cellation of indebtedness income.2 The issues become more complicated if the
transfer is to a controlled corporation.
Transfers to controlled corporations differ fundamentally from transfers
to unrelated parties. For instance, transfers to controlled corporations often
represent mere changes in the form of legal ownership of property. Tax law
recognizes that difference and generally taxes transfers to unrelated parties-
but often allows tax-free contributions to corporations.3 Whereas liability
relief is part of the amount realized or cancellation of indebtedness income
if it is part of a transfer to an unrelated party, it generally does not trigger
gain or cancellation of indebtedness income if it is part of a contribution to a
controlled corporation.
If, as part of a section 351 transaction, a corporation assumes liabilities that
exceed the adjusted basis of the transferred properties, section 357(c) gener-
ally requires a taxpayer to recognize gain on the transaction.5 Taxpayers may
structure transactions to avoid section 357(c) gain. For example, a taxpayer
may contribute a self-created note to the corporation, hoping it will increase
the basis of contributed property, or reduce assumed liability. In Peracchi v.
Commissioner, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a share-
holder has a basis in a self-created note contributed to a corporation as part of
a section 351 transaction.' That holding allowed the taxpayer to avoid section
357(c) gain.7
*Bradley T. Borden is a Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School in Brooklyn, New York.
Douglas L. Longhofer is an Associate at Martin, Pringle, Oliver, Wallace & Bauer in Wichita,
Kansas. Professor Borden and Mr. Longhofer thank Danielle Schulte for her research assistance
with this Article.
'See, e.g., Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
2 See, e.g., Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); 2925 Briarpark Ltd. v. Commis-
sioner, 163 F.3d 313 (5th Cir. 1999); Gehl v. Commissioner, 102 TC 784 (1984).
3See I.R.C. § 1001(c) (requiring gain recognition generally on the disposition of property);
I.R.C. § 351(a) (allowing nonrecognition on transfers to controlled corporations). All section
references are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, unless stated otherwise.
4See I.R.C. § 357.
'See I.R.C. § 357(c).
'See Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487 (9th Cir. 1998). Importantly, the Ninth Cir-
cuit decided Peracchi under a prior version of section 357(c). See infra Part II.D.
'See Peracchi, 143 F.3d 487.
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The Ninth Circuit's holding in Peracchi sparked substantial debate because
it contradicted what many felt to be well-settled law: that section 357(c) oper-
ated mechanically and that methods to avoid section 357(c) gain were lim-
ited. Commentators suggest that by allowing the contributor to take a basis
in a self-created note, the court granted shareholders the power to eliminate
section 357(c) gain and essentially "pull the teeth" out of that section.
Commentators have advanced two general theories for the proper tax treat-
ment of contributed self-created notes since Peracchi, but neither of them
has satisfactorily addressed these transactions from both an economic and
tax perspective. This Article argues that a satisfactory theory of the proper
tax treatment of contributed self-created notes under section 357(c) should
satisfy four criteria (referred to hereafter as the "Four Criteria"): (1) recognize
the economic substance of the transaction; (2) appropriately tax both the
corporation and the shareholder on contribution; (3) properly account for
payments made by the shareholder on the note; and (4) properly treat the
corporation's subsequent disposition of the note or repayment of the liability.
Theories presented prior to this Article fail to adequately address these Four
Criteria.
Because the Four Criteria are essential to the analysis that follows, they
deserve brief consideration. First, a theory properly recognizes the economic
substance of a transaction if it considers whether a contribution alters a share-
holder's economic situation. For example, the theory must ask what interest
a shareholder takes in a corporation and how the contributed note affects
that interest. The theory must also properly account for the shareholder's
economic situation before and after the contribution. If the shareholder's
economic situation does not change as part of the contribution, neither the
shareholder nor the corporation should recognize gain or loss on the contri-
bution.
Second, the theory must appropriately tax both the contributing share-
holder and the corporation. That generally requires that the shareholder and
corporation recognize no gain or loss on the contribution. It also requires that
the shareholder and corporation take the appropriate bases in the stock and
contributed property.
Third, the theory must properly account for the shareholder's payment on
the contributed note. The treatment of the shareholder's payment must be
consistent with the treatment of the contribution and generally should not
result in taxable gain or loss to the shareholder or corporation.
'Michael M. Megaard & Susan L. Megaard, Risky Business: Can a Shareholder' Own Note
Truly Avoid Section 357(c) Gain?, 89 J. TAXN 69, 69 (1998). But see BORIS 1. BITTKER &JAMES
S. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 3.06[4] [b],
at 3-35 (7th ed. 2000) ("To be sure, [if a contributed self-created promissory note is effective
to eliminate section 357(c) gain, section] 357(c) would lose its potency; but this would not
compromise its function, because the note in fact eliminates the benefit that the transferor gets
from transferring property subject to liabilities in excess of basis-the very same protective job
assigned to [section] 357(c).").
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Fourth, the theory must properly treat the disposition of the note by the
corporation. This treatment should relate to the tax treatment applied to the
contribution of the note. The theory must also properly account for any pay-
ments the corporation makes on the assumed liability. That treatment should
be consistent with tax treatment afforded the contribution of the note.
The discussion below reveals that the Peracchi decision fails to properly
account for the basis in the note, so it fails the second criterion. That failure
causes difficulties with the third and fourth criteria. Therefore, its rationale
is unacceptable. As a result of Peracchi, the existing theories and criticisms
often focus on whether the note constitutes property for purposes of a section
351 exchange, and whether the note has a basis in the shareholder's or the
corporation's hands.' One such theory, which this Article refers to as the sep-
arate-transaction theory, argues that the law should not treat stock issued in
exchange for self-created notes as stock issued for property.'o This theory sug-
gests that the law should treat the contribution of property and self-created
notes as two separate transactions-the transfer of property in exchange for
stock and the transfer of the note in exchange for stock." The separate-trans-
action theory fails, however, to appropriately tax the contribution. Under this
theory, the shareholder will often recognize gain on the contribution. Thus,
the separate-transaction theory fails the second criterion.
Other commentators have proposed an open-transaction theory.12 This
theory leaves the transaction open, requiring the shareholder to accrue basis
in stock as payments are made on the note.13 This theory fails the fourth cri-
terion by not properly addressing the corporate disposition of the note. The
discussion below illustrates that this failure creates unnecessary confusion by
potentially giving the contributor of the self-created note a negative basis in
the stock received.' 4
This Article suggests that a fully developed liability-offset theory, which
views the contribution of a self-created promissory note as a reduction of the
9 See, e.g., Stuart Lazar, Lessinger, Peracchi, and the Emperor' New Clothes: Covering a Sec-
tion 357(c) Deficit with Invisible (or Nonexistent) Property, 58 TAX LAw. 41, 91 (2004) ("[I]t is
incumbent upon Congress to amend section 351(d) to provide that stock issued in exchange
for a shareholder promissory note shall not be considered issued in exchange for property.");
Ted J. Tierney, Peracchi: Magicians in the Ninth Circuit Court?, 26 S.U. L. REv. 197, 223-24
(1999) (arguing that a multi-factor test is appropriate to determine whether the contributed
note represents valid indebtedness, and if the note is genuine, the taxpayer should avoid section
357(c) gain because the taxpayer's basis will be increased to offset any excess liabilities).
"See Lazar, supra note 9, at 91. Accordingly, the separate-transaction theory removes stock
issued for self-created shareholder promissory notes from the purview of section 351.
"See infia Part III.A (discussion of the separate-transaction theory).
Q See, e.g, Elliott Manning, The Jssuers Paper: Property or What? Zero Basis and Other Income
Tax Mysteries, 39 TAx L. REv. 159, 195 (1984).
"See infra Part III.B (discussion of the open-transaction theory).
"See infra Part III.B (discussion of the open-transaction theory).
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liabilities assumed by the corporation, satisfies the Four Criteria." Instead of
analyzing whether the note increases basis in the transferred assets, the liabil-
ity-offset theory suggests that the self-created note should reduce, or offset,
the amount of liabilities assumed by the transferee corporation. If the note
represents valid indebtedness, the liability-offset theory reflects the intent of
lawmakers, recognizes the economic substance of the transaction, and avoids
problematic issues that arise from giving the note basis in the hands of the
corporation or the shareholder. Furthermore, the liability-offset theory allows
for the appropriate tax treatment when the shareholder makes payments on
the note and when the corporation subsequently factors the note.'6 The lia-
bility-offset theory helps explain why the tax-free treatment in Peracchi is
correct, even though the court's reasoning is flawed.
Part II of the Article briefly reviews the tax rules governing corporate forma-
tion. It explains the rationale for section 351 nonrecognition and the section
357(c) exception to the nonrecognition rule. It also reviews the case law and
rulings that have considered the proper tax treatment of a contributed self-
created note. Finally, it recounts legislative developments that help inform
the analysis of the liability-offset theory. Part III presents and critiques the
separate-transaction and open-transaction theories of Peracchi, and illustrates
how they fail to satisfy the Four Criteria. Part IV presents the liability-offset
theory and illustrates how it satisfies the Four Criteria and presents a better
way to consider contributed self-created notes. Part V concludes.
II. Tax Rules Governing Corporate Formation
The analysis of the proper tax treatment of contributed self-created notes
begins with a brief review of the tax rules governing corporate formation. The
formation rules and the policy supporting the rules lay the groundwork for
analyzing the Peracchi decision and commentary that criticizes it. Although
Peracchi generally receives top billing in discussions about contributed self-
created notes, it is one of several cases that consider the issues raised by such
contributions. Those cases provide a nice review of the development of the law
"Other commentators have presented varying forms of a liability-offset theory as a means of
addressing contributed self-created promissory notes. See, e.g., Steven Quiring, Section 357(c)
and the Elusive Basis of the Issuer's Note, 57 TAX LAw. 97, 119 (2003) ("Rather than looking to
the note for basis in order to avoid section 357(c) gain, the note may be considered a means of
allocating the liabilities between the shareholder and the corporation.").
'"Commentators proposing versions of the liability-offset theory prior to this Article have
argued that the note is not a transferrable asset in the corporation's hands. See Jasper L. Cum-
mings, Jr., Zero Basis Hoax or Contingent Debt and Failure ofProof. Sorting Out the Issues in the
Lessinger Case, 2 FI.A. TAx REV. 283, 321 (1994) (arguing that when the contributed note is
used to reduce the amount of debt assumed or taken subject to for purposes of section 357(c),
"[t]he note should not be an independently transferrable asset of the corporation"); Quiring,
supra note 15, at 124 ("Any action taken by the corporation that violates this model, such as
selling the note . .. would serve as evidence that the debt really was assumed by the corpora-
tion."). In contrast, this Article argues that the note can offset the liabilities assumed and
nevertheless still be transferrable by the corporation. See infra Part IV.B.
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governing contributed self-created notes. Finally, examining section 357(d)
provides a good analogy for analyzing contributed self-created notes.
A. Corporate Formation Under Section 351
Section 351 generally allows shareholders of controlled corporations (exist-
ing or in formation) to contribute property to the corporation in exchange
for corporate stock without recognizing gain or loss." The justification for
this nonrecognition rule is that contributions to a controlled corporation are
"merely a change in the form of ownership, like moving a billfold from one
pocket to another."" Consequently, tax law views a contribution of property
to a controlled corporation as a change in the form of legal ownership and
generally does not tax the transaction. Because a contribution to a controlled
corporation is a mere change in ownership, any unrecognized gain or loss
should survive the change of ownership form.
The basis rules of sections 358 and 362 preserve the unrecognized gain or
loss at both the shareholder and corporate level. Section 358 provides that
the shareholder's basis in stock received as part of a section 351 transaction is
generally equal to the basis the shareholder had in the contributed property.'
This "exchanged basis" 20 is subject to an upward adjustment for gain the share-
holder recognizes, and a downward adjustment for money or other property
the shareholder receives from the corporation. Thus, the law preserves any
gain or loss the shareholder does not recognize upon contribution. 2 1
Section 362 provides that the corporation shall take a basis in the contrib-
uted property equal to the basis the shareholder had in the property, increased
by gain the shareholder recognizes on the contribution. 2 2 Unrecognized gain
thus also survives in the basis a corporation takes in contributed property. As
a result, section 351 grants nonrecognition on contributions to controlled
"See I.R.C. § 351. Absent the nonrecognition rule of section 351, shareholders contribut-
ing property to a controlled corporation would recognize any gain or loss realized on the trans-
action. See I.R.C. %§ 61(a)(3), 1001(c); see also Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (stating that section 351 is
an exception to the general recognition requirement of section 1001(c)). Under section 351,
nonrecognition treatment is given only to contributions made to "controlled corporations." See
I.R.C. § 351 (a) (stating that to qualify for nonrecognition the "person or persons" transferring
property in return for stock must control the corporation immediately after the exchange); see
also Reg. § 1.351-1. For purposes of section 351 transactions, control requires the contributing
shareholder or shareholders to own "stock possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting
power of all classes of stock entitled to vote" and "at least 80% of the total number of shares of
all other classes of stock." I.R.C. § 368(c).
'"Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 E3d 487 (9th Cit. 1998) (providing Judge Kozinski's
explanation of section 351); see also Reg. § 1.1002-1(c) (stating that the underlying assump-
tion behind the recognition exception of section 351 is that there is still a continuation of the
old investment).
19 See I.R.C. § 358(a).
20See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(44).
21See 1.R.C. § 358(a).
2 2See I.R.C. § 3 6 2(a). The basis the corporation takes in the contributed assets is referred to
as a "transferred basis." See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(43).
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corporations, but sections 358 and 362 preserve the unrecognized gain both
inside and outside of the corporation. The subsequent taxable transfer of
either the stock or contributed property will trigger gain or loss recognition.
As a result, a contribution of property to a corporation creates a second gain,
but section 362(e)(2)(A) prevents the creation of a second loss. 23
The nonrecognition and basis rules work together to accomplish the pur-
pose of corporate tax law. Tax law seeks to not affect the decision to incor-
porate. By allowing tax-free formations of and contributions to controlled
corporations tax law does not discourage the mere change in the form of
ownership. Thus, the law allows business owners to form corporations tax-
free, but it taxes subsequent transactions that remove assets from the pre-for-
mation business. Rules governing contributions of encumbered property and
self-created notes must comprehend these fundamental purposes of corporate
tax law; they should not deter the formation of corporations or contributions
to them.
B. Shareholder Liabilities and Section 357
Tax law generally provides that amount realized includes liability from which
a transferor is relieved as part of a transfer.24 Nonetheless, the section 351
nonrecognition rules apply generally, even if the corporation assumes liabili-
ties of the contributor.25 Section 357 governs corporate assumptions of con-
tributing shareholder liability and deviates from the general rule that requires
a transferor to include liability relief in amount realized.2 6 If a corporation
assumes a shareholder's liabilities as part of a section 351 transaction, section
357(a) provides generally that the liability relief is not money or other prop-
erty received on the exchange.2 7 For purposes of computing shareholder basis,
the corporate formation rules treat liabilities assumed by the corporation as
money received on the exchange, which results in a downward adjustment to
23See I.R.C. § 362(e)(2)(A). When property with a net built-in loss is contributed to a cor-
poration, section 362(e)(2)(A) generally limits the corporation's basis in such property to the
property's fair market value at contribution, preventing a second built-in loss.
24See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983); Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1
(1947); Reg. § 1.1001-2(a).
25Congressional intent to facilitate, or at least not discourage, business incorporation can be
found in the nonrecognition rule of section 351. See supra Part II.A (discussion of section 351).
The nonrecognition rule is generally extended to liability relief associated with a section 351
transaction under section 357. See infra Part II.B (discussion of section 357). See also Lazar,
supra note 9, at 46 (stating that Congress adopted section 351 and its Code predecessor in part
because requiring gain when the disposition of property is merely a change in form interferes
with necessary business operations).
26 See I.R.C. § 357.
27See I.R.C. § 357(a). The general rule of section 357(a) is subject to two major exceptions
in sections 357(b) and 357(c). See I.R.C. § 357(b) (providing that when the liability assump-
tion by the corporation is to avoid taxation, or when the assumption does not otherwise have
a valid business purpose, the assumption will be treated as money received by the transferor);
I.R.C. § 357(c).
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the shareholder's stock basis.28 The basis adjustment helps preserve the double
gain created under sections 358 and 362.
Section 357(c) provides an exception to the favorable tax treatment in sec-
tion 357(a).2 9 That exception requires the contributing shareholder to rec-
ognize gain if the corporation assumes liabilities in excess of the aggregate
adjusted basis of contributed properties.3 o Section 357(c) and the basis rules
in section 358 work together to prevent the shareholder from taking negative
basis in stock received on the contribution. The prevention of negative basis
is often cited as a primary reason for section 357(c).31 Thus, section 357(c)
is not an anti-abuse rule that otherwise requires gain recognition. Instead, it
embraces corporate tax law's disdain for negative basis. The rule can produce
inequitable tax results.
Commentators have referred to section 357(c) as an unsophisticated tax-
payer's "trap for the unwary,"32 forcing less sophisticated taxpayers to recognize
gain that they could potentially avoid through various planning techniques.
Commentators, practitioners, taxpayers, and the courts have, however, con-
tinuously engaged in lively debate about when and how a taxpayer is able to
avoid section 357(c), suggesting the trap may affect sophisticated taxpayers
as well.3 3 These debates, the hardships created when section 357(c) forces
taxpayers to recognize gain absent a corresponding economic benefit, and the
inefficiency that results when taxpayers adjust business arrangements to avoid
section 357(c) suggest that the general understanding of the scope of section
357(c) is unsatisfactory.
Commentators agree generally that taxpayers can employ two different
methods to avoid the negative tax treatment of section 357(c) nonrecogni-
tion.34 First, a taxpayer may contribute additional cash or property to the
corporation so that the aggregate adjusted basis of the contributed properties
28See I.R.C. 5 358(d).
-See I.RC. 5 357(c).
30See I.R.C. § 357(c).
31See, e.g., Lazar, supra note 9, at 53 ("The most common rationale for section 357(c) is that
it prevents a taxpayer from having a negative basis in the stock received pursuant to a section
351 exchange.").
32See, e.g., J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., The Highly Avoidable Section 357(c): A Case Study in Traps
for the Unwary and Some Positive Thoughts About Negative Basis, 16 J. CoRP. L. 1, 31 (1990).
33 Other articles discussing Peracchi, Lessinger, and avoiding section 357(c) gain include
the following: John A. Bogdanski, Corporate Debt, Shareholder Debt: Lessons from Leavitt and
Lessinger, 16 J. CoRP. TAX'N 348 (1990); Cummings, supra note 16; Fleming, supra note
32; John E Hernandez, Using Shareholder Notes to Eliminate Section 357(c) Gain: Lessinger
v. Commissioner, 872 E2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989), Correct Result, Wrong Reason, 20 MEMPHIS
ST. U. L. REv. 355 (1990); Susan Kalinka, Peracchi: What Is the Right Result?, 59 LA. L. REv.
871 (1999); Lazar, supra note 9; Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8; Quiring, supra note 15;
Tierney, supra note 9; Jon R. Wadsworth, A Metaphor a Day Keeps the Tax Man Away: Peracchi
v. Commissioner, 27 W. ST. U. L. REv. 467 (1999-2000).
34See Lazar, supra note 9, at 55.
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is equal to or exceeds the liabilities assumed by the corporation.35 Second,
a taxpayer may remain liable for a portion of the liabilities such that the
amount of liabilities assumed by the corporation is equal to or less than the
aggregate adjusted basis of the transferred properties.16 Generally, a contribu-
tor of property secured by recourse debt may remain liable for the transferred
debt by agreeing that the corporation is not to pay the debt, and by ensur-
ing that the corporation "pays the fair unencumbered market value to the
[contributor] for the property."7 Thus, a taxpayer can avoid section 357(c)
gain either by contributing more property to increase the basis of contributed
property (the basis-increase method), or by remaining liable for a portion of
the liability and reducing the amount of liability assumed (the liability-offset
method).
A third method used to avoid section 357(c) gain, contributing a self-cre-
ated note, has raised considerable controversy. If the contribution of a self-
created note is similar to contributing more property or money, or is similar
to offsetting liability assumed, either the basis-increase method or the liabili-
ty-offset method would be an appropriate method for analyzing the contribu-
tion of a self-created note. Courts and commentators have, for the most part,
relied upon variations of the basis-increase method, focusing on whether, for
purposes of section 351, the note has sufficient basis to "eliminate the gap
between the basis of the property transferred and the amount of liabilities
assumed."3  The basis-increase method as applied by the courts disregards
the effect a self-created note has on liabilities assumed, and strains traditional
accounting and tax principles by allowing a contributor to generate basis by
creating his own obligation. This Article argues the better approach is to apply
a liability-offset theory, which would treat the contributed self-created note
as a reduction in liabilities assumed by the corporation. It builds on observa-
tions by some commentators who have recognized that the contribution of a
bona fide note has the same effect as "a note given by the [contributor] to a
35 See id.; see also Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487, 493 (9th Cir. 1998) (stating that
to avoid section 357(c) gain "Peracchi could have borrowed $1 million from a bank and con-
tributed the cash to [the corporation] along with the [contributed] properties").
3
'See Lazar, supra note 9, at 55. For an example where a taxpayer avoids section 357(c) gain
by retaining personal liability, see infra Part II.D.
37BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 1 3.06[2]. The amount of liabilities assumed by the
transferee corporation affects the amount "paid" by the corporation for the underlying prop-
erty, and thus alters the economics of section 351 transactions. For example, if A transfers
property worth $1000 and subject to $250 of recourse liability in exchange for all of the stock
of a corporation, the amount of liability assumed will alter the value of stock received. Eco-
nomically, A will only be willing to engage in this transaction in return for either (1) $750 of
stock and the corporation's assumption of the $250 of recourse liability, or (2) $1000 of stock.
See, e.g., id. at n.99. The tax law should generally follow economics to the extent possible, and
section 357(d) strives to meet this goal by providing that recourse liability is only assumed by
a transferee corporation if the corporation agrees to pay the liability and is expected to pay the
liability. See I.R.C. § 357(d); see also infra Part II.D (discussing section 357(d)).
3
'Lazar, supra note 9, at 55.
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bank or other third parry before the [section] 351 exchange to raise cash to
reduce the liabilities to which the transferred property is subject."39 The fol-
lowing review illustrates the evolution of the law governing the contribution
of self-created notes. The evolution has led to the Peracchi decision, which
embraces the basis-increase method.
C. Judicial and Regulatory Interpretations of Section 357(c)
Originally, the Service and courts did not allow taxpayers to count a contrib-
uted self-created note as basis of contributed property. In Revenue Ruling
1968-629, the Service first considered whether a shareholder in a section 351
transaction could avoid section 357(c) gain by contributing a self-created note
to a corporation in an amount equal to the excess of the liabilities assumed
by the corporation over the aggregate basis of the contributed property. 0 In
its analysis, the Service first determined that the transferor had a zero cost
basis in the note under section 1012.41 After concluding that the transferor
did not have a basis in the note, the Service found that issuing the note "did
not increase the basis of the assets transferred."42 The Service did not consider
whether the self-created note should affect the amount of liability assumed
by the corporation. As a result, the liabilities assumed by the corporation
exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the assets, and the self-created note did not
help the shareholder avoid section 357(c) gain.43
In Alderman v. Commissioner, the Tax Court followed the Service's ruling
and held that the contribution of a self-created note in a section 351 transac-
tion did not eliminate section 357(c) gain.44 The Tax Court also held that
the corporation took a transferred zero basis in the note under section 362.15
In finding that the Aldermans must recognize section 357(c) gain despite
the contribution of the self-created note, the Tax Court stated that "[t]o
conclude otherwise . . . would effectively eliminate section 357(c) from the
[Code because] it would be a relatively simple matter to execute a note so that
the adjusted basis would always exceed liabilities."46 This statement by the Tax
Court disregards the economic reality of contributing a promissory note and
treats section 357(c) as an anti-abuse provision. Thus, the court deviated from
39BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 8, 1 3.06[4] [b); see also Peracchi, 143 F.3d at 493 (discuss-
ing the possibility of a taxpayer borrowing cash from a bank and contributing that borrowed
cash in a section 351 transaction to eliminate section 357(c) gain).
40 See Rev. Rul. 1968-629, 1968-2 C.B. 154.
"See id. (stating that under section 1012, the basis of property is its cost, and the transferor
did not incur a cost in making the note).
42Id
43Id. The Service's theory in Revenue Ruling 1968-629 for dealing with shareholder promis-
sory notes and section 357(c) gain has been termed the "zero-basis theory," or the "zero-basis
hoax" by detractors. See Quiring, supra note 15, at 101 (citing Kenneth P. Brewer, The Zero
Basis Hoax, 63 TAX NOTES (TA) 457, 458 (Apr. 25, 1994)).
155 TC. 662 (1971).
'
5 d. at 665.
4Id
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the overall purposes of the rules governing contributions to corporations.
The Tax Court's holding in Alderman and the Service's ruling in Revenue
Ruling 1968-629 failed each of the Four Criteria. First, the court required
the contributor to recognize taxable gain on contribution, even though the
contributor had no economic gain. Second, the court required the transferee
corporation to take a zero basis in the note. Third, the corporation's zero basis
meant the corporation would subsequently be taxed on each payment made
by the contributor, effectively putting the corporation in a worse position
than if the taxpayer had not contributed the note.47 Finally, by giving the
corporation a zero basis in the note, the Alderman decision failed to provide
for the proper tax results from the corporation's subsequent disposition of the
note. The corporation's disposition of the note would most likely generate
gain to the corporation equal to the full amount realized from the sale. This
violates the purposes of the corporate formation rules.
Nevertheless, following the Tax Court's ruling in Alderman, the "major
issues dealing with section 357(c) seemed to be settled."4 8 While section
357(c) occasionally produced harsh results for the contributor, it was not
a provision that shareholders could generally avoid. Subsequent decisions
in Lessinger v. Commissioner and Peracchi v. Commissioner revealed, however,
that the issue was not settled. 0 Both the Second Circuit in Lessinger, and the
Ninth Circuit in Peracchi, held that a shareholder could effectively avoid sec-
tion 357(c) gain by contributing a self-created note in an amount equal to or
exceeding the excess liabilities assumed over the adjusted basis of the contrib-
uted properties.5 The rationale in Lessinger is somewhat confusing; the court
in Peracchi adopted the basis-increase method.
In Lessinger (1989), the Second Circuit agreed with precedent that the cre-
ator of a note does not have a basis in that note. 52 Nevertheless, the court
found that the statutory language did not adequately address the situation
if the shareholder's obligation had a discernable value to the transferee cor-
poration.53 The court concluded that when a shareholder remains personally
liable to the corporation through the contribution of a self-created note, the
basis referred to in section 357(c) is "the transferee's basis in the obligation,
which is [the note's] face amount."" Thus, the court did not explicitly adopt
47See Lazar, supra note 9, at n. 110 (arguing that giving the corporation zero basis in the
note "would place the corporation in a worse tax position" than if the Aldermans had not
contributed the note, but instead made subsequent section 118 taxable contributions to the
corporation).
"Quiring, supra note 15, at 101.
49 See id.
5
oSee id.; Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 E3d 487, 487 (9th Cir. 1998); Lessinger v. Com-
missioner, 872 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1989).
5 1Peracchi, 143 F.3d at 496; Lessinger, 872 E2d at 526.
52 Lessinger, 872 F.2d at 525 (arguing that the contributor could not have a basis in the self-
created note because the note represented a liability to him, not an asset).
53Id.
54Id. at 526.
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the basis-increase method (which would have given the shareholder basis in
the note), but it considered the corporation's basis in the note. The major
flaw in the Second Circuit's analysis is that the court determined the basis
of the contributed note from the transferee corporation's perspective and
not the shareholder's perspective." It is difficult to understand how a trans-
feree corporation could have a face-value basis in a contributed note. Section
362(a) grants the corporation a transferred basis (i.e., the shareholder's basis)
in property received and the court determined that the contributor's basis in
the note was zero."6 Consequently, commentators have strongly criticized the
Lessinger reasoning for ignoring the basis rules that apply to section 351 trans-
actions and granting the corporation a section 1012 cost basis in the note.5 7
That criticism reveals that the result fails the second of the Four Criteria-it
is inconsistent with existing basis rules.
Even though the criticism of the Lessinger opinion is well founded, the
Second Circuit introduced an important "economic benefit test to the section
357(c) analysis."5 1 The court adopted this test in part because of the Lessingers'
contention that they "realized a gain in neither an 'accounting nor economic
sense."'59 As a result, the Lessinger court's "decision to reverse the Tax Court
seems based on its belief that the taxpayer did not in fact realize a gain from
the transaction."60 The court found that the Lessingers did not realize an eco-
nomic benefit because the liability to the corporation was real and potentially
enforceable by the corporation's creditors.6' If a shareholder has not economi-
cally benefited through liability relief, then requiring gain recognition is argu-
ably inconsistent with congressional intent to minimize the tax consequences
recognized upon corporate formation. 62 Thus, despite the shortcomings of
the Lessinger opinion, the court's incorporation of economic realities into the
section 357(c) analysis provided an important addition to the self-created
note issue.63 Nonrecognition is a theoretically sustainable conclusion, based
upon the economic realities of the transaction-if the shareholder's economic
"See Hernandez, supra note 33, at 365 ("The fundamental flaw in the Second Circuit's
approach is its determination of the basis of the shareholder's note from the transferee-corpo-
rations perspective, while adhering to the commonly accepted methodology for determining
basis, for all other purposes, under the purview of section 362.").
'6See Lessinger, 872 E2d at 525. The Lessinger court's holding is the result of a circular read-
ing of the basis rules in section 351 transactions. If a contributor has a zero basis in a note
transferred to a corporation in a section 351 transaction, the corporation necessarily must have
a transferred basis of zero in that note pursuant to section 362. On the other hand, if the cor-
poration is found to have a face-value basis in the contributed note (as found in Lessinger), then
the contributor necessarily must also have a face-value basis in the contributed note because
the corporation's basis in property received is computed from the transferor's basis.
"See Quiring, supra note 15, at 110.
"See id. at 111.
"Hernandez, supra note 33, at 362 (citing Lessinger, 872 E2d at 522-23).
6
oQuiring, supra note 15, at 111.
61 See Lessinger, 872 E2d at 527.
62See, e.g., Hernandez, supra note 33, at 372.
6"See Quiring, supra note 15, at 111-12.
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situation does not change, the shareholder should not recognize gain or loss.
Thus, the opinion satisfied the first of the Four Criteria. The decision did not,
however, adequately address the basis rules, so it failed the second criterion.
In Peracchi (1998), the Ninth Circuit departed from the Second Circuit's
reasoning in Lessinger and explicitly used the basis-increase method to hold
that a shareholder does not recognize gain on the contribution of a self-created
note.' The court determined that section 357(c) contemplates measuring the
basis of the property contributed in the hands of the taxpayer, not the corpo-
ration.' Notably, however, the court found that the taxpayer had a basis in a
self-created note equal to the note's face value.66 The Ninth Circuit found that
the note represented genuine indebtedness by referencing the note's bona fides
and full transferability and the enforceability by third-party creditors.67 After
determining that the note was not a sham, the court reasoned that whether
the creator of a note incurs a cost in creating it depends on whether there is a
significant enough possibility that the note would be enforced through bank-
ruptcy or third-party creditors.68 The court found that Peracchi's obligation
on the note was not conditioned upon the corporation remaining solvent,
and thus the note represented "a new and substantial increase in Peracchi's
investment in the corporation."69
The Peracchi decision resolves the Lessinger basis problem by finding that
the maker of a note takes a basis in the note equal to the note's face value.
That finding provides consistency with the corporate-formation basis rules.
To reach this result, the court recognized that the "basis of property shall
be the cost of such property"17 and accordingly asked, "[w]hat does it cost
Peracchi to write the note and contribute it to his corporation?"7 Arguably
the cost to create a note is nominal, including materials and perhaps profes-
sional fees. The cost should never approach the face value of the notes. Critics
are therefore quick to point out that promises to pay are generally liabilities
and not property, and the creator of a note should not have a basis in the
"Peracchi v. Commissioner, 143 F.3d 487, 494 n.17 (9th Cir. 1998).
65Jdj
"See id. at 494-95. Importantly, the Ninth Circuit limited its holding to situations where
(1) the contributor's credit warrants the note being worth the note's face value, and (2) the
corporation receiving the note is "subject to a nontrivial risk of bankruptcy or receivership."
See id. at 493-94 nn.14-15.
67 d. at 495.
6Id. at 493.
69 d In the Peracchi opinion, Judge Kozinski supports the court's result by using an eco-
nomic analysis very similar to the "cash analogy" for shareholder notes and 357(c) gain. See
Quiring, supra note 15, at 115 ("The core of the cash analogy approach is that a note should
be treated the same as cash.").
7oPeracchi, 143 F3d at 492 (quoting I.R.C. § 1012).
711d. at 492.
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promise to pay.72 Nonetheless, the court held that the creator's basis in a con-
tributed self-created note equals the note's face value. 73
Generally, a self-created liability produces section 1012 cost basis in prop-
erty acquired using the liability.74 Section 1012 does not create basis in the
self-created note. Instead the purchaser takes a basis in the acquired property
"because the law assumes that [the] . . . obligation will be paid or directly
enforced by the seller and thus gives the obligor advance basis for the prom-
ise of future payment."75 Most commentators believe, however, that even if
a self-created note is treated as a purchase money obligation for purposes of
section 351, it does not appear that the note should generate immediate basis
similar to a section 1012 purchase. The primary shortcoming of the Peracchi
decision is the grant of section 1012 cost basis equal to the face value of a
self-created note.
The Peracchi decision does not appear to meet the Four Criteria. First, giv-
ing the contributing shareholder basis in the contributed self-created note
does not necessarily recognize the economic substance of the transaction.
The note does not create a new or separate asset in the shareholder's hands.
Second, tax law generally does not give the creator of a note a basis in the
note, so Peracchi appears to reach a result that is inconsistent with general tax
principles. Third, the basis-increase method in Peracchi may cause problems
when the shareholder makes payments on the note, or if the corporation sells
the note.77
An alternative view of Peracchi, however, brings the theory closer to the
liability-offset theory proposed in this Article. The Ninth Circuit found that
Peracchi's self-created note increased his investment in the corporation and
the law should credit Peracchi for this additional investment.78 From an eco-
nomic perspective, the contributed note reduces the liability assumed by the
corporation, increasing the corporation's net capital. Generally, net capital
grows by increasing assets or decreasing liabilities. Thus, an alternative view
of the Ninth Circuit's finding that Peracchi's note increased his investment
in the corporation is that his investment increased corporate net capital by
72See, e.g., Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 73 ("[A) shareholder obligation should not
be treated as a contribution of property with a cost basis equal to its face amount.... [I]n the
hands of the shareholder-transferor the obligation is a liability-not property with a zero basis
or any other basis.").
"See Peracchi, 143 F.3d at 494-95.
74See Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 73.
75Id.
'See id. (arguing that a contributed self-created note should instead "be treated as a contin-
gent obligation to make future capital contributions that is given in an open purchase transac-
tion, which generates basis to the transferor only when it is paid").
nFor example, because the shareholder already has basis in stock and the corporation already
has basis in the note, the law would have to develop a method for accounting for the payments
that would not distort the transaction.
"See Peracchi, 143 F.3d at 493 ("[The note] represents a new and substantial increase in
Peracchi's investment in the corporation.").
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decreasing the corporation's assumed liabilities. Viewed from this perspective,
the Ninth Circuit's conclusion becomes aligned with the theory that the note
is best viewed as offsetting the corporation's liability assumption.7 9 The court's
failure to fully develop that view created difficulties and confusion.
In summary, both the Second and Ninth Circuits reached the same gen-
eral conclusion-a shareholder may avoid section 357(c) by contributing a
self-created note in a section 351 transaction. The outcomes are, however,
based on different reasoning, which leaves the law somewhat unsettled in this
area."o Both opinions are the result of a questionable application of the law,
but both opinions also reach a result that is sympathetic to the taxpayer who
does not realize an economic gain on the transaction. Subsequent legislation
in a related area suggests that the liability-offset theory is a better approach to
dealing with contributions of self-created notes.
D. Liability-Offiet Under Section 357(d)
In 1999, Congress changed the law governing contributions of encumbered
property to a corporation by modifying sections 357 and 362. These changes
codify a liability-offset theory, but they do not directly address contributions
of self-created notes. This Article suggests that the principles in 357(d) should
extend to contributions of self-created notes. Historically, section 357(c)
required a shareholder to recognize gain when (1) the corporation acquired
property subject to a liability that exceeded the basis of the property trans-
ferred, or (2) the corporation assumed a liability in excess of the transferred
property's basis.8 2 The amendments to section 357 removed the reference to
the transferee corporation acquiring property subject to a liability for pur-
poses of determining section 357(c) gain.8 3 Thus, section 357, as amended,
applies solely to liabilities assumed by the corporation.
The amendments to section 357 also added section 357(d), which clari-
fies when a transferee corporation is deemed to assume a liability as part of
a section 351 transaction. Accordingly, liability assumption has become "a
term of art [under current law], which includes some, but not all, situations
in which property is 'taken subject to' a liability."" Under section 357(d),
whether a corporation assumes a liability depends in part on whether the
liability is recourse or nonrecourse." In general, the law considers a corpora-
tion to assume a nonrecourse liability "any time that the asset subject to such
79See infra Part IV (discussing the liability-offset theory).
"oSee Lazar, supra note 9, at 76.
"See Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Corrections Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-36,
§3001(b), 113 Stat. 127, 182-84.
82See John A. Bogdanski, Section 357(D)-Old Can, New Worms, 27 J. CoRP. TAX'N 17, 17
(2000).
83See id. at 18.841d
85See I.R.C. § 357(d).
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liability is transferred to the corporation.""6 On the other hand, a corpora-
tion assumes recourse liabilities only when, as determined by the facts and
circumstances of the situation, the corporation agrees to, and is expected to,
satisfy the liability-whether or not the transferor has been relieved of the
liability.87 The following discussion focuses on the corporations assumption
of recourse liabilities."
While the change to section 357 informs the analysis of Peracchi and incor-
poration transactions in general, this effect was not Congress's goal in modi-
fying the law.89 Instead, Congress designed the modifications in section 357
to "combat a relatively arcane international tax-shelter abuse"90 where foreign
corporations attempted to create artificial basis by manipulating the liability-
assumption rules.9 ' Nevertheless, the amendments to section 357 and the
addition of section 357(d) effectively codify part of the economic benefit
arguments set forth by the Second Circuit in Lessinger.92 The Lessinger court
found that taxing a shareholder who has not recognized a corresponding ben-
efit would amount to taxing "truly phantom gain."93 Because current law
86 Lazar, supra note 9, at 60; see also I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(B).
"7See I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(A).
"Shareholders have more difficulty retaining a share of nonrecourse liability that does not
already encumber property. Imagining a situation that would compel a shareholder to take
personal liability for a recourse loan is difficult. Therefore, this discussion does not consider the
application of the liability-offset theory to nonrecourse liabilities.
"The legislative history of the amendments to section 357 states that both Lessinger and
Peracchi contributed to uncertainty surrounding section 357(c). See STAr OF J. COMM. ON
TAX'N, 106TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S
FISCAL YEAR 2000 BUDGET PROPOSAL 198-99 (Comm. Print 1999).
90 Karen C. Burke, Contributions, Distributions, and Assumption of Liabilities: Confronting
Economic Reality, 56 TAx LAw. 383, 383 (2003) (citing Miscellaneous Trade and Technical Cor-
rections Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-36, § 3001(a)(1), (d)(2)-(5), 113 Stat. 127, 181-84).
9 1 d. To illustrate the international tax-shelter abuse targeted by Congress, imagine a foreign
parent corporation not subject to U.S. tax with two U.S. subsidiaries and two zero-basis assets
each subject to a single $200 liability. Under former law, if the foreign parent separately trans-
ferred each zero-basis asset to each subsidiary, the subsidiaries would be entitled to a step-up
in basis equal to the full amount of the liability ($200) because the assets were "subject to"
the debt. See, e.g., Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 20. The results of this transaction would be
an overstated basis by the U.S. subsidiaries without the transferor corporation incurring U.S.
taxable gain as a result of the liability relief. See id.
92 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 90, at 391 ("In effect, section 357(d)(1)(A) codifies the
economic benefit theory underlying the 1001 regulations."). The section 1001 regulations
state that the "sale or other disposition of property that secures a recourse liability dis-
charges the transferor from the liability if another person agrees to pay the liability." Reg.
§ 1.1001-2(a)(4)(ii). Thus, the transferor only includes the liability in his amount realized
when he has received the economic benefit of the other party agreeing to pay that liability.
While similar in intent and in theory, the section 1001 regulations are not identical to the
language of section 357(d)(1)(A) with regard to recourse liabilities. See Burke, supra note 90, at
391 ("The section 1001 regulations require merely that the transferee agree to pay the underly-
ing recourse liability, while section 357(d) provides that the transferee must also be 'expected
to' pay such liability.").
93 Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 E2d 519, 527 (2d Cir. 1989).
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requires the transferee to agree to, and be expected to, pay the recourse liabil-
ity to effect an assumption, current law is much less likely to tax gain, unless
the shareholder recognizes a corresponding economic benefit.
An example illustrates the effect of section 357(d). Derek and Alex decide
to open and operate a sporting goods store, Legends Equipment, Inc. Their
business model provides that Derek will be the two-thirds majority share-
holder, and Alex will own the other one-third of Legends's shares. To capital-
ize Legends, Derek contributes $400,000 cash in exchange for 200 shares
of Legends common stock, and Alex contributes all of the business assets
and liabilities of his sole proprietorship. At the time of contribution, Alex's
sole proprietorship has $150,000 of recourse liabilities and assets with a fair
market value of $300,000. The assets have an adjusted basis of $100,000.9'
In exchange for his contribution, Alex receives 100 shares of Legends com-
mon stock. Finally, in order to obtain the desired ownership ratio, the parties
agree that the corporation will be liable for only $100,000 of Alex's liabilities,
and Alex will repay the remaining $50,000 balance.95 The parties execute an
agreement that complies with section 357(d), stating that the corporation
does not agree to, nor is it expected to, satisfy $50,000 of Alex's liabilities.9'
Derek and Alex's transaction is not unexpected in business practice. Parties
often incorporate businesses by transferring liabilities and property to the
corporation. Moreover, Derek and Alex's structure accomplishes their eco-
nomic objectives. Because Alex retained $50,000 of liabilities the net value of
his contribution to the corporation was $200,000, which accurately reflects
the parties' ownership arrangement when balanced against Derek's $400,000
cash contribution.9 7 In fact, if Legends were to assume any amount of liabili-
ties other than $100,000, Alex and Derek would not accomplish their eco-
nomic objectives.
Under former section 357, Alex and Derek would have had more difficulty
accomplishing their business objectives if one party contributed liabilities
in excess of basis. As stated above, former section 357(c) appeared to apply
whenever a corporation acquired "property subject to a liability" in excess of
the basis of the properties transferred.98 Thus, under prior law, Alex may have
94The $100,000 adjusted basis in the business assets transferred is a reflection of the assets'
initial cost adjusted by depreciation deductions Alex took on the property under section 168 of
the Code. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(2) (requiring a downward adjustment to basis for depreciation
deductions taken). The liabilities would not give rise to deductions if paid.
"Disclaiming $50,000 of the recourse debt allows Derek to be the two-thirds majority
shareholder and Alex the one-third minority shareholder. Derek's contribution of $400,000
cash to Legends indicates that Alex needs to make a net contribution of $200,000 in order to
comply with the parties' economic agreement. But, Alex's contribution of $300,000 in prop-
erties and the corporation's assumption of $150,000 of liabilities yields a net value contribu-
tion of only $150,000. Thus, Legends expressly disclaims $50,000 of the liability to yield the
proper business arrangement and a $200,000 net value contribution by Alex.
96See I.R.C. § 357(d).
91See supra note 95 (discussing the economic realities of the Legends incorporation).
9
"See I.R.C. § 357(c)(3) (1988); Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 18.
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recognized $50,000 of gain, even though he was not relieved of liabilities
exceeding the aggregate basis of the properties he contributed to the corpora-
tion." Currently, however, section 357(c) applies only if a corporation actu-
ally assumes liabilities in excess of basis.' 00 Because Legends does not assume
$50,000 of Alex's liabilities, Alex's liability relief equals the basis of property
he contributed, and he should not recognize any gain on the contribution. 0 '
Alex will take a zero basis in his Legends stock because the $100,000 liability
the corporation assumes reduces the $100,000 basis Alex had in his business
assets.o 2 This result reflects the economic intent of the parties.
Tax law must also contemplate the future payment of the assumed and
unassumed liability for section 357(d) to work well. If, pursuant to sec-
tion 357(d), a transferee corporation only assumes a portion of the transf-
eror shareholder's liabilities, the tax accounting for the unassumed liabilities
should remain the shareholder's responsibility. 03 Some commentators sug-
gest this becomes problematic if the agreement is broken and the corporation
ultimately pays off the liability. Corporate tax law should treat liability repay-
ments by the corporation as "constructive distributions to the shareholder
under section 301-dividends to the extent of the earnings and profits of a C
corporation or former C corporation."0 4 Furthermore, the corporation's pay-
ment of the liability would call into question the original liability disclaimer
agreement. This may give rise to deemed section 357(c) gain by the transferor
on the original section 351 transaction, instead of a distribution under section
301.105 A review of the accounting treatment of a section 357(d) transaction
and subsequent transactions will illustrate the effectiveness of section 357(d)
and foreshadow the application of the liability-offset method to contributed
self-created notes.
Corporate tax law is not bound by the accounting treatment a transaction
receives, but a modified version of the accounting treatment helps illustrate
the economic aspects of the transaction. The analysis uses journal entries that
"Because Alex contributed properties to Legends with an adjusted basis of $100,000
"subject to" liabilities of $150,000, the liability relief deemed by former section 357(c) of
$150,000 would have exceeded the basis of the properties transferred by $50,000. See Lazar,
supra note 9, at 56 ("Prior to 1999, it appeared to be well-settled law that retaining personal
liability for debts transferred to a controlled corporation did not reduce the amount of liabili-
ties transferred to such corporation in order to prevent the application of section 357(c)."); see
also Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 74 (arguing that the court had generally "applied
[s]ection 357(c) mechanically without examining whether the transferor has really been
relieved of the transferred debts").
00See I.R.C. § 357(a).
'1Because Legends assumes $100,000 of liabilities, and Alex's aggregate basis in the proper-
ties transferred is equal to $100,000, Alex should not recognize any section 357(c) gain.
'
02See I.R.C. § 358(d)(1).
10
3See Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 28.
05See id. (stating that it is unclear how far the Service would be allowed to look back in
"determining relevant parties' agreement and expectation").
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rely upon the tax basis of assets instead of GAAP's fair market value. These
journal entries will help analyze the application of the liability-offset theory to
contributed self-created notes. Because the corporation assumes a portion of
Alex's liabilities, the analysis focuses on the tax accounting treatment for Alex
and the corporation with respect to the liabilities the corporation assumes
and those it does not assume. Before the contribution Alex had $150,000 of
liabilities and assets worth $300,000, in which he had a $100,000 adjusted
basis. Alex remained liable for $50,000 of the liabilities following the contri-
bution. Upon contribution to the corporation, Alex would debit liabilities
$100,000 and credit business assets $100,000. Alex received stock in which
Alex would take a zero basis. Alex's journal entry for the contribution would
be as follows:
Alex's Treatment of Contribution
Liabilities $100,000
Legends Stock $0
Business Assets $100,000
The corporation received assets and incurred liabilities. The corporation's
journal entry would be as follows:
Corporation's Treatment of Alex's Contribution
Business Assets $100,000
Liabilities $100,000
Even though this entry appears to indicate the corporation received noth-
ing of value from Alex, recall that the value of the property Alex contributed
exceeded the amount of the liability encumbering the property. Thus, Alex
contributed something of value to the corporation. Alex's economic situation
remains significantly similar to his situation before the contribution.
Journal entries also help illustrate the effect subsequent payments of the lia-
bilities by Alex or the corporation would have on the parties. If Alex were to
pay the $50,000 of liabilities for which he remained liable, he would reduce
his cash and liabilities by that amount. The journal entries would be as fol-
lows:
Alex's Subsequent Payment of Retained Liabilities
Liabilities $50,000
Cash $50,000
Alex's payment of that liability would not affect the corporation because
Alex's liability was to a third party.
If the corporation paid all or a portion of the $100,000 liability it assumes,
it would have the following journal entries to show a reduction in cash and
liabilities:
Corporation's Payment of Liabilities
Liabilities $100,000
Cash $100,000
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Because the corporation assumed $100,000 of Alex's liability, Alex was no
longer liable for that portion of the liability and the corporation's payment
would not affect Alex's tax situation.
Borrowing by the corporation would generally be routine and the tax treat-
ment fairly straight forward. The corporation may decide to use the property
Alex contributed as collateral for another loan and therefore borrow $50,000
against the property. That will give the corporation an additional $50,000
of cash and $50,000 liability. The following journal entry illustrates the loan
from the corporation's perspective (the loan would not affect Alex).
Corporation's Borrowing Against Contributed Property
Cash $50,000
Liabilities $50,000
The transactions that deserve closer attention are those that affect Alex and
the corporation directly. If the corporation were to directly repay all, or a por-
tion, of the liability for which Alex remained liable, a portion of that repay-
ment would be equivalent to the corporation making a distribution to Alex
and Alex repaying the loan. Assume for example, that the corporation repays
$50,000 of liability for which Alex remained liable. Such a payment would be
a deemed distribution by the corporation to Alex, followed by Alex's repay-
ment of the loan. The following journal entries illustrate the transaction.
Deemed Corporate Distribution
Owner's Equity $50,000
Cash $50,000
Deemed Receipt by Alex
Cash $50,000
Income $50,000
Loan Repayment by Alex
Loan $50,000
Cash $50,000
Section 301 would govern the tax treatment of that deemed distribution.
If the corporation has earnings and profits, the distribution should be a divi-
dend to Alex. Otherwise it would be a return of Alex's capital or a return on
his capital.o 6
If Alex directly repaid all, or a portion, of the corporation's $100,000 liabil-
ity, the transaction would be deemed a contribution by Alex followed by
a deemed repayment to the corporation. 0 7 That transaction would increase
Alex's basis in his corporate stock and reduce the corporation's liability. Tax
law easily addresses this type of transaction.
'
0 See I.R.C. § 301(c)(1), (2).
or~his assumes that the distribution is in excess of Alex's basis in his Legends stock. See
I.R.C. § 301(c).
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Deemed Contribution to Corporation Alex
Stock $100,000
Cash $100,000
Corporation
Cash $100,000
Owner's Equity $100,000
Deemed Payment by Corporation
Debt $100,000
Cash $100,000
Those several journal entries help illustrate the nature of a section 357(d)
transaction and subsequent transaction between Alex and the corporation.
Understanding the nature of the transaction helps establish the proper tax
treatment for each aspect of the various transactions. Taxing the contribu-
tion, the assumption of a portion of the liabilities, and the repayment of the
liabilities are not difficult tasks once the nature of the transaction is clear. The
discussion below illustrates that a contributed self-created note has the same
effect and can be accounted for similarly under the liability-offset theory-
but first consider why shareholders would consider using self-created notes
after the enactment of section 357(d).
If section 357(d) provides an easy planning opportunity that helps taxpay-
ers avoid the perils of section 357(c), the question arises whether taxpayers
need the option of self-created notes to avoid the section 357(c) trap. Prior
to the enactment of section 357(d), taxpayers could only reduce the amount
of liability assumed by the corporation with a self-created note. In theory, the
introduction of section 357(d) and the removal of the "subject to" language
in section 357 should reduce the need for shareholders to create notes to
eliminate section 357(c) gain. 0 8 Instead, shareholders contributing properties
with excess recourse liabilities could agree that the corporation is not assum-
ing liabilities in excess of the transferred basis of the assets. In this manner,
section 357(d) is a welcome addition to the Code, preserving the nonrecog-
nition framework of section 351 transactions and reducing the potential for
taxpayers to recognize gain absent a corresponding economic benefit.
On the other hand, section 357(d) contains ambiguity,'09 so relying upon
it for planning purposes is not always simple or certain. First, in order for a
corporation to assume a recourse liability, the corporation must be "expected
to" satisfy the liability."o If the corporation and the transferor reach an
agreement for the corporation to satisfy a recourse liability, the law creates
0
8See, e.g., Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 26 ("Section 357(d) may signal an end to the debate
[over shareholders reducing section 357(c) gain] . . .at least as to recourse debt."); Burke, supra
note 90, at 391 ("As a practical matter, it is no longer necessary for shareholders to furnish
their own obligations to offset excess recourse liabilities. Thus, section 357(d) should generally
eliminate the LessingerlPeracchi zero-basis controversy.").
1o9See Burke, supra note 90, at 391.
"'See I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(A).
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a presumption that the transferee corporation will meet the section 357(d)
expectation test."' "If the expectations of the transferor and the transferee
corporation differ," however, the law is not clear about which party's expecta-
tions should control.112 Moreover, the expectations of the third-party creditor
should also help determine which party is expected to pay, but "the statute
apparently contemplates only an agreement between the transferor and the
transferee."" 3
In addition, determining when a shareholder has actually been relieved of
a liability for purposes of section 357(d) may be difficult. For example, in
Seggerman Farms v. Commissioner, the Tax Court held that personal guaran-
tees of corporate debt were not economic outlays and were thus insufficient
to eliminate section 357(c) gain." 4 The Tax Court decided Seggerman under
prior law, but it stated that the personal guarantees executed by the taxpayers
would be insufficient under current law to avoid section 357(c) gain."'
As an alternative to personally guaranteeing the excess liability, commenta-
tors have argued that the most effective method for avoiding section 357(c)
gain under current law is to (1) execute an agreement between the corporation
and the shareholders providing that "the shareholders and not the corporation
will satisfy" the excess liabilities, and (2) execute an agreement requiring the
shareholder to indemnify the corporation against the consequences of fore-
closure on the property to satisfy the liability."' The shareholder's indemnity
agreement should provide further evidence the corporation did not assume
all of the shareholder's liability, but it also closely resembles the shareholder
guarantee deemed ineffective in Seggerman Farms. "7
The facts and circumstances test employed in section 357(d) creates uncer-
tainty because it requires ascertaining the allocation of economic burdens
between related taxpayers." Even with an agreement between the parties as
to the amount of debt the transferee corporation is assuming, the parties may
have difficulty determining the actual liability relief of a related transferor." 9
Shareholders may be able to avoid those ambiguities by contributing a self-
created note. Furthermore, some lenders may resist arrangements that do not
make corporations primarily responsible for a liability. The shareholder's note
will help avoid any problems resulting from such resistance. Thus, despite the
changes in the law since Peracchi, shareholders may seek to avoid the potential
"'See Burke, supra note 90, at 392.
112See id
113d.
" 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1543, 2001 T.C.M. (RIA) j 17, afd, 308 F.3d 803 (7th Cir. 2002).
"
6 See Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 26; Burke, supra note 90, at 391.
"'
7 See Bogdanski, supra note 82, at n.26 (discussing a shareholder's indemnity as "tanta-
mount to a shareholder guarantee").
" See Burke, supra note 90, at 393.
"'See id. ("Because there is no objective measure of whether a related transferor has been
relieved of a liability, regardless of the parties' agreement, the economic benefit model of sec-
tion 1001 may be misplaced in the context of section 351 transfers.").
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problems of section 357(c) and 357(d) by contributing a self-created note to
the corporation.
In summary, Peracchi, the changes made to section 357(c), and the enact-
ment of section 357(d) have brought the law much closer to preserving the
economic intent of the shareholders as compared to the law that existed
before Peracchi. Executing an agreement limiting the corporation's assump-
tion of all recourse liabilities in excess of basis is likely the most direct way to
avoid section 357(c) gain. Section 357(d) thus eases planning difficulty and
helps eliminate a trap for the unwary. Unfortunately, the requirements of sec-
tion 357(d) produce some uncertainty for taxpayers. Thus, for business pur-
poses, and possibly at the behest of third-party creditors, some taxpayers may
still wish to contribute self-created notes to preserve the parties' economic
objectives and avoid section 357(c) gain. In those situations, the law should
accord with section 357(d)-the shareholder's note demonstrates that the
shareholder has retained liability equal to the amount of the note, and cor-
respondingly the amount of liabilities assumed by the corporation should be
reduced. Viewing the contribution of a self-created note as a liability retained
by the shareholder helps resolve problems inherent in existing theories of
Peracchi. The next Part illustrates how the liability-offset theory, as opposed
to other theories, should apply to contributed self-created notes.
III. Existing Theories on Section 357(c) Gain and Shareholder Notes
The Lessinger and Peracchi decisions attracted significant attention and criti-
cism. As the discussion above suggests, some commentators felt sympathetic
to the taxpayers' situations, but most thought the cases were wrongly decid-
ed.'20 Commentators have presented two main theories as recommendations
for solving problems they recognize in the Peracchi decision. Unfortunately,
neither of the proposed theories has adequately addressed the issue from both
an economic and tax perspective. To be complete, a theory directing the tax
treatment of contributed self-created promissory notes and section 357(c)
should comport with the nonrecognition goal of section 351 transactions to
the extent possible, and also preserve the economic intent of the taxpayers to
the extent possible. In short, a theory on contributed self-created promissory
notes and section 357(c) should satisfy the Four Criteria.12 '
120See, e.g., Quiring, supra note 15, at 97 ("[The Lessinger and Peracchi] decisions performed
a valuable service by reexamining the troublesome zero-basis theory adopted in Alderman,
but neither one has replaced it with an entirely satisfactory rationale."); Tierney, supra note
9, at 198 (arguing that Peracchi was decided incorrectly "because the Peracchis did not create
genuine debt when they transferred the personal promissory note to the corporation"). But see
John A. Bogdanski, Section 358 and Crane-A Reply to My Critics, 57 TAx LAw. 905, 905-06
(2004) ("Tihe Peracchi court got [the analysis of contributing shareholder notes to avoid sec-
tion 357(c) gain] mostly right, [while] the Second Circuit in Lessinger reached the correct result
for the wrong reason.").
'
21See supra Part I.
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This Article divides the Peracchi criticism into two general theories. The
Article labels the first the separate-transaction theory, and the second the
open-transaction theory. The following discussion illustrates that both theo-
ries deviate from the basis-increase method and the liability-offset method
that apply generally to corporate contributions. Thus, they both create new
approaches to analyze contributions to corporations.
A. Separate- Transaction Theory
The separate-transaction theory claims that a contributed self-created prom-
issory note should not be property for purposes of section 351.122 Instead,
the theory advocates treating any stock not issued for property as issued in a
transaction separate from the contribution. 2 3 "This would [require] taxpay-
ers to bifurcate transactions in which assets and liabilities are contributed to
a corporation into (1) stock for property exchanges covered by section 351,
and (2) other taxable exchanges."124
This theory eliminates some of the potential difficulties arising from the
courts' analyses in Peracchi and Lessinger. Specifically, a taxpayer who trans-
fers a note to a corporation will receive a basis in the stock received from the
corporation equal to the amount of the note, and the corporation will take a
basis in the shareholder's note equal to the face value of the note.12 5 Section
351 will apply separately to the contributions of property. An example illus-
trates the separate-transaction theory. Assume that Andy transfers the assets
of his sole proprietorship plus his own promissory note to form X Corp in a
section 351 transaction. The transferred business assets have an aggregate fair
market value of $500,000 and an adjusted basis of $150,000. Andy's prom-
issory note has a face value of $150,000. In exchange for his contribution,
Andy receives all of the common stock of X Corp, valued at $350,000, plus
X Corp's assumption of $300,000 of business liabilities.
The separate-transaction approach treats Andy as receiving $150,000 of X
Corp stock in exchange for his promissory note and the remaining $200,000
of stock in exchange for the transferred business assets and X Corp's liability
assumption. Under the separate-transaction theory, Andy's note does not fac-
tor into the section 357(c) analysis, so the debt assumed by the corporation
will exceed the basis of the property Andy contributes. Accordingly, Andy
recognizes $150,000 of gain, the excess of the $300,000 liabilities assumed by
X Corp over his adjusted basis in the business assets. Andy takes a $150,000
section 1012 cost basis in the stock he receives in exchange for his note and a
1
22See Lazar, supra note 9, at 91 ("[I]t is incumbent upon Congress to amend section 351(d)
to provide that stock issued in exchange for a shareholder promissory note shall not be consid-
ered issued in exchange for property.").
'
23 See id.
124 d
I 25 See id
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zero basis in the remainder of his X Corp stock.126 In addition, X Corp takes
a $300,000 basis in the business assets and a $150,000 section 1012 cost basis
in the note.12 7
The separate-transaction theory forces Andy to recognize section 357(c)
gain even though he is in the same financial situation before and after the sec-
tion 351 transaction. The transfer to the corporation is a mere change in legal
ownership. Before forming X Corp, Andy had $500,000 in assets, $300,000
in liabilities, and built-in gain in his business assets of $350,000.128 Andy's net
capital was $200,000 before forming the corporation. After forming X Corp,
Andy had $350,000 in assets and $150,000 in liabilities.12 9 Thus, his net
capital remained $200,000 after the corporate formation. Nonetheless, Andy
recognized $150,000 of gain on the transaction and after forming X Corp,
Andy's aggregate built-in gain in the assets he owns reduced from $350,000
to $200,000.13o Consequently, the separate-transaction theory required Andy
to recognize gain and altered his tax attributes, even though his economic
situation did not change. Thus, the separate-transaction theory violates the
first of the Four Criteria.
The separate-transaction theory sufficiently deals with many of the prob-
lems generated by the circuit court opinions of Peracchi and Lessinger by giv-
ing both the shareholder and the corporation basis consistent with statutory
rules. Moreover, the separate-transaction theory minimizes problems related
to the corporation's subsequent disposition of the note by giving the corpora-
tion basis equal to the fair market value of the note-thus avoiding illusory
gain on a subsequent disposition.'"' The separate-transaction approach does
not, however, avoid the harsh results of section 357(c) gain. The shareholder
contributing a promissory note under this approach may recognize gain with-
1 2 6Andy's basis in the remainder of his stock is calculated under section 358 as an exchanged
basis of $150,000, minus $300,000 of debt assumed by X Corp, plus $150,000 of gain recog-
nized by Andy on the transaction.
1 27X Corp's basis is a transferred basis of $150,000 under section 362(a), increased by the
$150,000 of gain recognized on the exchange by Andy.
128Andy's built-in gain at contribution is equal to $350,000 because the contributed busi-
ness assets have a fair market value of $500,000 and an adjusted basis of $150,000.
'
29The $350,000 in assets is represented by Andy's stock ownership and the $150,000 in
liabilities is the note Andy issues to X Corp.
130After forming X Corp, Andy owns two different blocks of stock: $200,000 of stock with
a $0 basis, and $150,000 of stock with a basis of $150,000. In the aggregate, the built-in gain
in all X Corp stock owned by Andy is $200,000.
''Under the separate-transaction theory, X Corp would be able to sell Andy's note for face
value immediately after receiving the note and not have to recognize gain. If the note had a zero
basis in the corporation's hands, X Corp would apparently be forced to recognize gain equal to
the fair market value of the note on subsequent disposition. See Alderman v. Commissioner,
55 TC. 662, 665 (1971); supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
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out receiving a corresponding economic benefit, 13 2 and therefore the separate-
transaction theory fails to satisfy all of the Four Criteria.
B. Open-Transaction Theory
The open-transaction theory for taxing the contribution of self-created notes
suggests treating the issuance of the note as an open transaction between the
parties instead of a transfer of property.'33 Advocates of the open-transac-
tion theory argue that it is the best approach to deal with "the Service's real
concern-the difficult related-party aspect of the transaction."' Under the
open-transaction theory, neither the contributing shareholder nor the corpo-
ration is given basis in the note at the time of contribution.135 Instead, the
shareholder's subsequent payment on the note creates basis that becomes a
capital contribution or a stock subscription.' 6
The open-transaction theory for contributed self-created notes mirrors the
tax treatment that applies to partners who contribute self-created notes to
partnerships. 1 Under partnership tax law,
if a promissory note is contributed to a partnership by a partner who is the
maker of such note, such partner's capital account will be increased with
respect to such note only where there is a taxable disposition of such note
by the partnership or where the partner makes principal payments on such
note.138
The partnership tax rules similarly deny the contributing partner basis in
the partnership interest until the partner makes payments on the note."
Partnership tax, unlike corporate tax, mixes aggregate and entity views of
taxation,'4 0 so it may be more suited to the open-transaction theory. The
aggregate aspect of tax partnerships facilitates the open-transaction treatment
because the contributing partner is a co-owner of partnership property for
132See, e.g., Lessinger v. Commissioner, 872 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1989) ("If Lessinger had
a 'gain' from the incorporation, it did not show up in his personal balance sheet, let alone by
way of economic benefit in his pocket.").
"'See Manning, supra note 12, at 195.
1
34 Id.
135 Id.
137See Lazar, supra note 9, at 88.
1
38Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2).
1
39 See Rev. Rul. 1980-235, 1980-2 C.B. 229 (stating that a partner's contribution of his
own promissory note does not increase outside basis because the partner has a zero basis in his
own written obligation until he actually makes payments on the note). The Peracchi decision
does not overrule Revenue Ruling 1980-235 because the Ninth Circuit was careful to limit its
holding to the circumstances of that case, and specifically declined to extend the holding to
the partnership tax context. See Lazar, supra note 9, at n.210 (citing Peracchi v. Commissioner,
143 F.3d 487, 494 n.16 (9th Cir. 1998)).
'oSee Bradley T. Borden, 7he Aggregate-Plus 7heory ofPartnership Taxation, 43 GA. L. REv.
717, 736-37 (2009).
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some purposes.' Even though the theory of partnership tax and corporate
tax differ significantly, the open-transaction theory in the partnership regime
nonetheless appears to provide comfort to some analysts. Unfortunately, the
open-transaction doctrine causes problems in the corporate context.
While the open-transaction approach reduces related-party concerns
between the shareholder and the corporation, the "solution is not without its
own problems."1 4 2 Critics of the theory have expressed concerns that delaying
basis to the contributing shareholder will result in confusion if the corporation
sells the note.1 4 1 This suggests that the open-transaction theory fails the fourth
criterion of the Four Criteria-the appropriate tax treatment of the corpo-
ration on the subsequent disposition of the contributed note. Additionally,
problems may arise on the disposition of the shareholder's shares before the
shareholder pays the note in full.14 4 The law would have to address the tax
treatment of payments the shareholder makes on the note following the stock
sale. That could create unnecessary complexity. Finally, a commentator has
argued that if the open-transaction theory prevents recognition of gain, it fails
to "address the primary concern of section 357(c)-that taxpayers should not
have a negative basis in their stock investment.""' This indicates the open-
transaction theory may also fail the second criterion. Thus, the open-transac-
tion theory cannot adequately govern the contribution of self-created notes.
IV. The Liability-Offset Theory
Because existing law and theories fail to adequately address all of the issues
presented by contributions of self-created notes, this Article recommends the
liability-offset theory. The liability-offset theory, if fully developed, helps solve
the Peracchi problem. Commentators have previously applied theories to
Peracchi that help lead to the liability-offset theory. 6 This Article formalizes
and expands upon earlier commentary to develop the liability-offset theory
and analyze contributed self-created notes under section 357(c). Under the
141See, e.g., I.R.C. § 704(c) (requiring the partnership to take into account pre-contribution
gain or loss in allocating partnership tax items associated with contributed property).
'
42See Lazar, supra note 9, at 87.
'
43See, e.g., Bogdanski, supra note 33, at 354. Alternatively, it may be possible to provide the
corporation with basis in the note at the time of the sale, and the interposition of an indepen-
dent creditor addresses concerns that generally arise in related-party transactions. See Quiring,
supra note 15, at 118.
1
4
1 See Quiring, supra note 15, at 118.
'
45Lazar, supra note 9, at 90 ("Applying the open transaction doctrine to the situation when,
pursuant to a transaction governed by section 351, a corporation assumes liability in excess of
the adjusted basis of the assets transferred, the shareholder who transfers his own promissory
note in addition to such assets and liabilities would still receive stock in which his basis was
less than zero.").
'
46See Cummings, supra note 16, at 299 ("The correct analysis ... is that the transferor's
obligation is not property for purposes of section 351 and the obligation ... is relevant to the
section 357(c) computation only if it reduces the transferor's liabilities assumed . . . ."); see also
Quiring, supra note 15, at 119 ("A better theory is that the transfer of a shareholder's own note
will avoid section 357(c) gain by reducing the liabilities assumed or taken subject to.").
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liability-offset theory, the self-created note operates as "a means of allocating
the liabilities between the shareholder and the corporation." 7 Economic real-
ities, which were first introduced into section 357(c) analysis by the Second
Circuit in Lessinger, help explain the liability-offset theory. Substantively, the
transferee corporation does not assume shareholder liabilities if one piece of
paper says that a $1,000 liability encumbers the transferred property and
another says that the transferor will pay or otherwise be responsible for that
$1,000 liability.' The substance of those two papers keeps the liability with
the shareholder. The form of the paper used to accomplish that task should
not affect whether the shareholder retains liability.
The original example of Derek and Alex forming Legends Equipment, Inc.
helps illustrate how the liability-offset theory could apply to contributions
of self-created notes."' Their business model stated that Derek was to be the
two-thirds majority shareholder, and Alex the one-third minority shareholder
in Legends. To comply with this economic ownership ratio, the parties agreed
that Alex would remain responsible for $50,000 of the $150,000 of recourse
liabilities assumed by Legends.150 Instead of executing an agreement with the
corporation and perhaps lenders, suppose that Alex contributes a $50,000
self-created note to Legends. Economically, this note is equivalent to the for-
mal agreement Alex executed in the original example, pursuant to which he
remained liable for a portion of the liability. Because Alex retains liability by
contributing the note, the law should treat him the same as it would under
section 357(d), had he used another method to retain liability. The liability-
offset theory helps obtain that equity. The liability-offset theory treats Alex's
$50,000 note as offsetting the $150,000 of liabilities assumed by the corpo-
ration, so Legends only assumes $100,000 of liabilities for section 357(d)
purposes. Under the liability-offset theory, the self-created note eliminates
section 357(c) gain, comprehends Derek and Alex's business arrangement,
and reaches the appropriate tax result on all aspects of the contribution and
subsequent transactions that relate to the note or assumed liability.
Valid business reasons may prompt Alex to execute a note to the corpora-
tion in lieu of executing an agreement to retain responsibility for a portion
of the liability. The note may provide a more formal documentation of the
parties' liabilities in the face of the uncertain "facts and circumstances" test of
section 357(d).'5' Furthermore, Derek may prefer a note for money manage-
ment purposes, such as facilitating the business liabilities of the corporation.
For example, Alex's liabilities may represent obligations to numerous parties.
1
4 7Quiring, supra note 15, at 119.
148See Cummings, supra note 16, at 299.
149See supra text accompanying notes 94-102.
'oDerek contributed $400,000 cash to Legends, while Alex contributed $300,000 in
business assets and $150,000 of liabilities. When Legends disclaims $50,000 of the liabilities
transferred, Alex's net contribution becomes $200,000 and the parties' intended economic
ownership ratio is reached.
'See I.R.C. § 357(d)(1)(A).
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Parsing through the obligations to decide which specific obligations Alex will
pay and which the corporation will pay would likely be an administrative
hassle that a single note may eliminate. If the corporation agrees to write
checks for the obligations as they become due, the parties can centralize the
administration of the payments to third parties and use the note to separately
monitor Alex's.responsibility for a portion of the liabilities.
Furthermore, a note may help avoid the troublesome issues that can arise
on the future satisfaction of the underlying transferred liabilities. As discussed
above, if Alex and Legends execute an agreement pursuant to which Legends
assumes a portion of Alex's liabilities, the tax accounting for the liabilities not
assumed should remain Alex's responsibility.'52 If, however, the corporation
in fact pays the liabilities Alex retained, the debt payments would be taxable
distributions to Alex under section 301, or a return of Alex's capital.15 3 The
Service could also use the subsequent payment of the liabilities by the corpo-
ration to challenge the original liability-retention agreement. Consequently,
the corporation's payment could give rise to a deemed gain on the original
transfer under section 357(c).154
Under the liability-offset theory, however, the corporation's payment of the
underlying debt does not have adverse tax affects-so long as the shareholder
contributes an offsetting note and the shareholder's note remains valid and
enforceable. Economically, there can be no liability relief to the transferor
when the corporation later pays the third-party liabilities in full. The corpora-
tion is primarily responsible for making payments on the liabilities to third
parties, and the payments made by the shareholder on the self-created note
correspondingly increase the corporation's assets and liabilities.155
A. Corporate Formation and Alex's Note Repayment
Journal entries help illustrate how the liability-offset theory applied to
contributed self-created notes is often similar to the section 357(d) results
obtained if the corporation assumes a portion of the shareholder's liability.
Upon formation, the corporation will assume $100,000 of Alex's liabilities
and receive $100,000 of Alex's business assets (the $50,000 note offsets the
remaining portion of Alex's $150,000 of liabilities). The journal entries upon
formation would be as follows:
Alex's Treatment of Contribution
Liabilities $100,000
Legends Stock $0
Business Assets $100,000
'
52See Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 28; supra text accompanying notes 103-07.
'
53See Bogdanski, supra note 82, at 28.
'0 See id.
'"See infra Part IV.A (discussing the tax and accounting consequences of note repayment).
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Corporation's Treatment of Contribution
Business Assets $100,000
Liabilities $100,000
The liability-offset theory treats Alex as retaining a portion of the liability,
so the corporation is deemed to assume less than the full amount of the liabil-
ity. Consequently, the corporation does not report the note as an asset, and
Alex retains $50,000 of the liability and preserves his pre-contribution gain.
If Alex makes a payment on the note, his portion of the retained liability
decreases. When the corporation receives a payment on the note from Alex,
the corporation's liability offset decreases. The receipt of payment therefore
increases the corporation's cash position and its liabilities. The following
entries illustrate how Alex's payment affects him and the corporation:
Alex's Treatment of Note Payment
Liabilities $50,000
Cash $50,000
Corporation's Treatment of Alex's Payment
Cash $50,000
Liabilities $50,000
This approach differs from earlier versions of the liability-offset theory.
Those earlier versions argued that the contributed self-created note transforms
the corporation into an agent or conduit for the shareholder with respect to
the third-party liability.'5 6 In other words, payments to the corporation by the
shareholder on the note would be treated as if they were made directly to the
third-party creditor. 57
The conduit theory also provides that if the corporation breaks from the
original agreement by continuing to make payments on the third-party liabil-
ity after the shareholder has fallen behind in payments, then the shareholder
cannot credibly argue that the corporation did not assume all of the liabili-
ty.'" Substantively, however, the corporation's payments do not change the
shareholder's liability, if the note is still valid and enforceable. The shareholder
remains liable on the note held by the corporation, so the corporation's pay-
ment does not bestow upon the shareholder an economic gain that should
result in taxation. Moreover, if the contributed note transforms the corpora-
tion into a conduit on the third-party liability, tax law cannot adequately
address the corporation's subsequent disposition of the note-a violation of
one of the Four Criteria.
O'See Quiring, supra note 15, at 124.
'
5 7See id.
See id. ("When a transferor falls behind in payments to the corporation, but the corpora-
tion continues to make payments to the outside creditor, then the transferor loses his justifica-
tion for claiming that the liability was not actually assumed by corporation.").
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Of course, to effectively offset the amount of liabilities assumed by the
corporation, the note must represent valid indebtedness of the shareholder.,
Thus, the corporation must enforce the note against the shareholder in the
same manner a third-party creditor would enforce it.o6 0 Consequently, third-
party standards should determine whether the note represents valid indebted-
ness and thus offsets the transferred liabilities. 161 Any condition or discount in
interest rate "that would cause a substantial discount to the note's value to a
disinterested third party should disqualify the note." 62 The shareholder's note
should not be so significantly different from the underlying liability that the
arrangement becomes a liability deferral for the shareholder.'63
B. Alex's Payment on and Corporate Disposition of the Note
Commentators who espoused early versions of the liability-offset theory have
nonetheless argued that if the note reduces the amount of the transferor's
liability assumed, "[tlhe note should not be an independently transferrable
asset of the corporation."6 4 Under this reasoning, the note's basis to the cor-
poration becomes irrelevant because the corporation is forbidden from selling
the note.'6 5 The idea that the corporation should be forbidden from selling
the shareholder's contributed note appears to be based on the premise that
these previous theories treat the corporation as a conduit between the transf-
eror and the original creditor. 166 Thus, the note is not a new obligation of the
shareholder.'6 7
By contrast, the more complete version of the liability-offset theory treats the
contributed note as offsetting the underlying debt, which provides economic
consistency, without compromising the transferability of the note itself. Tax
law should not force the shareholder to recognize gain when the shareholder
does not receive a corresponding benefit from an economic standpoint. Here,
the liability-offset theory complies with this goal by treating the note as off-
159See id. at 123 (arguing "that the burden of proof must be on the transferor to show" that
the note in fact reduces the liabilities assumed by the corporation).
16 Many commentators have expressed concern about the related-party nature of these
transactions and argued that the notes should be dismissed as contingent or speculative debt.
But see Bogdanski, supra note 120, at 909-10 ("Unfortunately for proponents of that view,
the Code says no such thing. Given the wide array of statutory provisions explicitly denying
tax benefits in certain specified types of related-party transactions, the absence of a provision
automatically denying basis benefits for debt owed by controlling shareholders to their corpo-
rations is quite telling.").
'
6
'See Quiring, supra note 15, at 124.
162M.
163 See id. at 123. ("For example, the taxpayer should not be able to avoid recognizing sec-
tion 357(c) gain by swapping a 20-year mortgage for his own note to the corporation payable
over 99 years.").
"Cummings, supra note 16, at 321; see also Quiring, supra note 15, at 124.
16 1 See Quiring, supra note 15, at 124.
'"See id. at 122-23 ("The corporation may be seen not as a new creditor, but rather as a
mere conduit between the transferor and the original creditor.").
167See id.
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setting the liabilities assumed under section 357(c). Even though the note
offsets liabilities assumed, it can be a transferrable asset of the corporation
without violating general tax principles or the intent of section 357(c).' 68
The modified version of the example of Derek and Alex helps illustrate
the tax treatment of the corporation's transfer of the note. Assume Alex con-
tributes a $50,000 note to Legends instead of otherwise agreeing to retain
$50,000 liability on the note. If Alex later pays $10,000 of principal on the
note, Legends will have a simultaneous increase of cash and liabilities-just
as if the corporation had borrowed $10,000 from a third party. The receipt
of cash increases the corporation's cash, and the reduction in liability offset
increases the corporation's liabilities. The following journal entries illustrate
how Alex's payment on the note affects Alex and the corporation:
Alex's Payment on the Note
Liability $10,000
Cash $10,000
Corporation's Receipt of the Note Payment
Cash $10,000
Liabilities $10,000
The note offsets the liability assumed, so the offset will equal $40,000 fol-
lowing the principal payments. Subsequently, if Legends sells the note to a
third party, the corporation receives cash, and the $40,000 offset is removed.
Legends, therefore, has $40,000 more of cash, as well as $40,000 in addi-
tional liabilities. Because Alex would remain liable for the note, the corpora-
tion's transfer would not directly affect Alex. The following entry illustrates
that factoring the note does not generate tax consequences:
Corporation's Treatment of Factoring the Note
Cash $40,000
Liabilities $40,000
If the corporation were to sell the note for less than the outstanding bal-
ance, it would have to account for the difference between cash received and
the reduction in liability offset. In effect, the corporation's liabilities would
increase by more than the cash it receives. That suggests that the corporation
would incur a loss on the transfer for which it must account. Because Alex
would remain liable for the note, the corporation's transfer of the note would
not directly affect Alex. The focus therefore is solely on the corporation.
Corporation's Treatment of Factoring the Note for Less than Face Value
Cash $30,000
Deduction/Loss $10,000
Liability $40,000
168See, e.g., id. at 126 ("Even if section 357(c) thus encourages the issuance of notes instead
of imposing gain, it still fulfills its purpose of preventing negative basis.").
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The deduction or loss would relate to the increased liability. Perhaps the
law should treat the $10,000 as the cost of obtaining the $30,000 loan.'16
If that is the case, the corporation may have to capitalize the amount and
deduct it over the life of the loan."' These journal entries help illustrate that
treating the contributed note as an offset helps account for the corporation's
subsequent disposition of the note.
C. Corporation's Payment of Liability in Full
To be valid, the liability-offset theory must also account for the corporation's
payment of the third-party liability in full. Assuming the corporation pays
the liability in full before Alex makes a payment on the note, the payment
will reduce the corporation's cash position more than it reduces the corpora-
tion's liability. The corporation's cash position would decrease $150,000, but
because of the liability offset, its liabilities would decrease only $100,000. The
law should treat the amount of excess cash paid over the liability reduction as
a loan from the corporation to Alex. Following the payment, the corporation
will have a note, which no longer offsets liability, so it will be deemed to be
an asset.
Before the repayment, Alex was deemed to owe the third party $50,000 as
an offset to the total third-party liability. After the repayment, Alex is liable
to the corporation for $50,000, so his position does not change. In effect, the
corporation's payment of the full liability is similar to the corporation repay-
ing $100,000 of liabilities and acquiring Alex's note from a third party for
$50,000. The journal entry would appear as follows:
Corporation's Full Repayment of Loan
Liabilities $100,000
Note $50,000
Cash $150,000
This discussion illustrates that a fully developed liability-offset theory satis-
fies the Four Criteria. It recognizes the economic arrangement and does not
tax either Alex or the corporation on the contribution. It also accounts for
the shareholder's subsequent payments on the contributed note, the corpora-
tion's disposition of the note, and the corporation's payment of the liability.
Therefore, the liability-offset theory accomplishes the tasks the Four Criteria
assign to it.
D. Support in Other Areas of Tax Law
Other areas of the law contemplate theories similar to the liability-offset
theory and help justify its use. For example, the law governing wraparound
mortgages supports the liability-offset theory."' Generally, when a taxpayer
69 See, e.g., Wilkerson v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 240 (1978); Reg. § 1.263(a)-5(a)(9).
70See Rev. Rul. 1975-172, 1975-1 C.B. 145 (ruling that the costs of acquiring a loan "must
be deducted ratably over the" entire duration of the loan).
.'. See Quiring, supra note 15, at 119-20.
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sells property encumbered by a mortgage, the installment sale regulations
permit the seller to wrap an equivalent recourse obligation around the exist-
ing mortgage. 172 In other words, a wraparound mortgage is an obligation
given by the buyer that wraps around an existing mortgage, allowing the
seller to continue to pay off the existing mortgage. 73 11The installment rules
provide that the seller's wrapped debt is not treated as assumed for purposes
of computing gain. 174
Unfortunately, the Tax Court rejected the use of the wraparound mort-
gage rule for section 357(c) transactions in a footnote in the memorandum
opinion of Owen v. Commissioner.'7 1 In affirming the result in Owen, the
Ninth Circuit found that while the shareholder attempted to retain liability
on the underlying debt by transferring his own promissory note, he none-
theless should recognize gain because the property remained subject to the
existing debt.'7 6 The court also incorrectly stated that section 357(c) should
apply regardless of whether the taxpayer receives an economic benefit as a
result of the transfer.'7 7 This idea runs contrary to the economic-benefit test
suggested by the Second Circuit in Lessinger, and is contrary to the economic
realities test of the liability-offset theory.17 The Tax Court issued the Owen
opinion under the prior "subject to" language of section 357, suggesting the
application of the wraparound mortgage rule is "ripe for re-examination by
the courts."'7 9 The liability offset justifies such re-examination.
The law governing like-kind exchanges of encumbered properties also sup-
ports the liability-offset theory.'" In general, section 1031 allows taxpayers to
exchange properties of a like kind without recognizing gain.'"' If, however,
encumbered property is exchanged for unencumbered property under section
1031, the liability relief is treated as money received on the transaction, trig-
gering gain recognition equal to the lesser of the boot or the realized gain on
'
72Typically a wraparound mortgage is utilized to "allow an existing mortgage with favorable
terms to stay in place and be paid off by the seller, rather than being assumed by the buyer or
refinanced." Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 76.
173 See Quiring, supra note 15, at 120.
1
7 4 See Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 76 ("This result is conditioned on (1) the
transferee not assuming the debt, (2) the transferor remaining solely liable to pay the debt, and
(3) the transferee paying the gross value of the property to the transferor with a purchase
money obligation secured by a wraparound mortgage.") (citing Prof'1 Equities Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 89 TC. 165 (1987)).
7553 T.C.M. (CCH) 1480, 1484 n.19, 1987 T.C.M. (RIA) 1 87,375, at 1877 n.19, afd,
881 E2d 832 (9th Cir. 1989). The Tax Court's "attempt to distinguish the installment sale situ-
ation, on the ground that it merely deals with the timing rather than the amount of gain recog-
nition as under section 357(c), was unpersuasive." Megaard & Megaard, supra note 8, at 76.
176See Owen, 881 F.2d at 835-36.
'
7 7See id. at 835.
178See Quiring, supra note 15, at 121-22.
'
79 d. at 121.
'See id at 120.
'See I.R.C. § 1031(a).
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the transaction.18 2 In Revenue Ruling 1979-44, the Service ruled that a tax-
payer could avoid liability-relief boot by issuing a note to the other party to
the exchange in an amount equal to the liability encumbering the transferred
property." "In so ruling, the Service necessarily determined that the note
offset the debt . .. and that the other party did not in substance assume the
burden of the debt."'14 Thus, in circumstances similar to transferring proper-
ties to a corporation, the Service has acknowledged that self-created notes
may offset liability assumption.
V. Conclusion
The highly criticized circuit court opinions of Lessinger and Peracchi have
produced numerous theories on the proper tax treatment of section 357(c)
and contributed self-created notes. Unfortunately, none of these theories is
wholly satisfactory. If a contributed self-created note is valid indebtedness of
the shareholder, the ideal application of section 357(c) is that the contributed
note reduces the liabilities assumed by the corporation, not that the note
generates immediate basis to the obligor. Congress paved the way for this
result through the introduction of section 357(d), which states that a trans-
feree corporation does not assume liabilities unless the corporation agrees to
pay the transferred liability and is actually expected to pay that liability. The
shareholder's contributed self-created note should serve as evidence that the
corporation is not agreeing to, or being expected to, pay the full amount of
the underlying liability.
In contrast to other works that have advanced a form of the liability-offset
theory, this Article argues that the self-created note can both offset the liabili-
ties assumed by the corporation and nonetheless still be a transferrable asset
of the corporation. As long as the contributed note is in the hands of the
transferee corporation, it offsets the liability. If the corporation sells the note,
the offset lifts, the corporation's liabilities increase, and the transfer is equiva-
lent to the corporation borrowing additional funds. Because the purpose of
section 357(c) is to prevent negative basis-but otherwise preserve section
351 nonrecognition treatment-tax law should avoid forcing the contribut-
ing shareholder to recognize gain, if the shareholder does not take negative
basis in the stock. The corporation's disposition of the shareholder's note has
no economic effect on the contributing shareholder; it simply changes the
note's obligee. Without gain in an economic sense, the law should not impute
taxable gain.
Moreover, restricting corporate alienability of the note does not have a
m'See1.R.C. 5 1031(b), (d). Under current section 1031, whether a party assumes a liability
is determined using the test for liability assumption in section 357(d). See I.R.C. § 1031(d)
("[Where as part of the consideration to the taxpayer another party to the exchange assumed
(as determined under section 357(d)) a liability of the taxpayer, such assumption shall be con-
sidered as money received by the taxpayer on the exchange.").
'
8 3 See Rev. Rul. 1979-44, 1971-1 C.B. 265.
184 Cummings, supra note 16, at 307.
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valid tax policy rationale when the note is properly viewed as offsetting cor-
porate liabilities. From the corporation's perspective, if the note offsets the
underlying liability, selling the note is equivalent to taking out a loan from a
third party. As a result, the liability-offset theory becomes the most complete
theory for analyzing the contribution of shareholder self-created notes as a
means of avoiding section 357(c) gain because it (1) preserves the parties' eco-
nomic substance of the transaction, (2) allows for the elimination of taxable
gain absent a corresponding economic gain, (3) treats payments made by the
shareholder on the note similar to the corporate borrowing, and (4) properly
treats a subsequent disposition of the note by the transferee corporation.
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